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Myanmar freedom on the net 2026

Myanmar remained the joint-worst country in the world for internet freedom in 2026, scoring 9 out of 100 points.

Myanmar has been joint-worst since 2024. The other countries with the same score in 2026 are China and Iran.

Human Rights Myanmar works with Freedom House on the annual review.

Myanmar remained one of the world’s worst environments for internet freedom. Telecommunications infrastructure continued to sustain damage amid the nationwide conflict that erupted after the military ousted the elected government in a 2021 coup. The military retained direct and indirect control over all major service providers, enabling mass censorship and surveillance. Sham elections held during the coverage period featured increased blocking of news sites, social media platforms, and anticensorship tools, while the military imposed localised internet shutdowns and arrested and imprisoned people for online expression under a new election law.

The detailed scoring system for Myanmar is below. Read the full global report on Freedom House’s website >

Global press release

Global internet freedom declined for the 16th consecutive year, with conditions deteriorating in 16 of the 38 countries assessed and improving in only 8, according to Freedom on the Net 2026: Seismic Shifts on the Global Internet, a new report released today by Freedom House. Authoritarian efforts to isolate populations from the global internet, expanding age checks for online access, and the weaponization of laws governing AI-generated content created new barriers to free expression and access to information.

Iran experienced the year’s largest decline, joining China and Myanmar as the world’s worst environments for internet freedom. Jordan and Nigeria also suffered significant declines, while Georgia’s status fell from Free to Partly Free as authorities continued to suppress online activism and speech perceived to be critical of the ruling Georgian Dream party. Bangladesh recorded the largest improvement for the second consecutive year, followed by the Gambia, while Estonia was the freest online environment. The report’s key findings include the following:

  • Authoritarian governments accelerated efforts to isolate their populations from the global internet. Iranian authorities imposed a nationwide internet shutdown lasting approximately 88 days, the longest recorded in Freedom on the Net’s history, and restructured internet access so that only a privileged few could connect to global platforms. Russian authorities expanded shutdowns and restrictions on virtual private networks while seeking to maintain access to state-approved services.
  • Age-assurance laws introduced new barriers to online access and risks to privacy and security. As of June 2026, policymakers in 10 of the 38 countries assessed had proposed, passed, or implemented age-assurance laws for social media platforms or other nonpornographic online content. Australia and Indonesia implemented social media bans for children under 16, while Turkey’s proposed framework would tie social media accounts to individuals’ real names through a government-run digital identity system.
  • Measures addressing AI-generated content tackled meaningful harms but also raised concerns about censorship. Governments pursued rules on impersonation, harassment, and child protection, but authorities abused some laws to restrict online expression. 

The United States’ score remained unchanged, but concerns about online expression persisted. Surveillance and legal penalties for online activity continued to pose challenges to free expression. The TAKE IT DOWN Act’s content-removal provisions took effect in May 2026, an important step against online sexual abuse, though concerns about safeguards against false reports remain.

The findings point to a need for investment in both access and protection: tools that bypass censorship must reach the people who need them, and those people must be able to connect without exposing themselves to surveillance or attack. The report provides recommendations to address both needs, alongside measures to protect children online without compromising privacy. They include the following:

  • Counter internet shutdowns and strengthen anticensorship tools. Internet service providers should publicly disclose the shutdown orders they receive and commit to challenging orders they consider disproportionate or unlawful. The US government should ensure robust funding for the Open Technology Fund, which supports the development of anticensorship tools tailored to human rights defenders and journalists around the world.
  • Expand satellite connectivity and strengthen digital security. Governments should advocate for access to emergency satellite internet connectivity at the ITU World Radiocommunication Conference in 2027. Donors should continue to support digital security training and rapid-response help lines for journalists and human rights defenders operating in high-risk environments.
  • Safeguard privacy and protect children online. Funders should invest in technical research to develop age-assurance methods that are truly privacy preserving and mitigate cybersecurity threats. Policymakers should strengthen child-specific protections in privacy laws and dedicate additional resources toward addressing online child abuse.

Freedom on the Net is an annual study of human rights in the digital sphere. This report, the 16th edition, covered developments between June 2025 and May 2026. The project now assesses internet freedom in 38 countries, accounting for about 70.9 percent of the world’s internet users. The report uses a standard methodology to determine each country’s internet freedom score on a 100-point scale, with 21 separate indicators assessing obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights.

Notes

This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2026 due to ongoing budget constraints. The U.S. administration’s decision to cut development aid also affected this project, resulting in a reduced report. The following scores are taken from previous full versions of the report.For additional background information, see last year’s full report on Freedom House’s website. 

A: Obstacles to Access

A120242025
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections?2/62/6
A220242025
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 0/30/3
A320242025
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity?0/60/6
A420242025
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers?0/60/6
A520242025
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner?0/40/4

B: Limits on Content

B120242025
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?0/60/6
B220242025
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?1/41/4
B320242025
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process?0/40/4
B420242025
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship?1/41/4
B520242025
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest?1/41/4
B620242025
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online?0/30/3
B720242025
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability?1/41/4
B820242025
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues?1/61/6

C: Violations of User Rights

C120242025
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence?0/60/6
C220242025
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards?0/40/4
C320242025
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards?0/60/6
C420242025
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption?1/40/4
C520242025
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy?1/61/6
C620242025
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy?0/60/6
C720242025
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities?0/50/5
C820242025
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack?1/31/3

Footnotes

[1] Amreesh Phokeer, “Myanmar Earthquake: A Crisis Within a Crisis,” Internet Society, April 1, 2025, https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/myanmar-earthquake-a-crisis-within-a-crisis; Oliver Spencer, “Civic Aftershock: How Restricting Civil Society Obstructed Myanmar’s Earthquake Response,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, September 2025, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Myanmar-Civic-Aftershock-ICNL.pdf.

[2] Myanmar Internet Project, “No End in Sight : Situation of Internet Shutdown and Infrastructure Damages in Myanmar,” Progressive Voice Myanmar, July 16, 2024, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2024/07/16/no-end-in-sight-situation-of-internet-shutdown-and-infrastructure-damages-in-myanmar/.

[3]  “Myanmar Communication Blackout, 2021 to Present,” Athan Myanmar, updated August 2025, https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; “Number of times the internet was cut off by Region and State (Feb 2021 to Current),” updated October 2025, Myanmar Internet Project, https://www.myanmarinternet.info/internet-shutdown.

[4] Surachanee Sriyai, “Myanmar’s Internet Shutdowns: Silencing Resistance in the Battle for Connectivity,” Fulcrum, January 24, 2025, https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-internet-shutdowns-silencing-resistance-in-the-battle-for-connectivity/.

[5] Grant Peck, “Myanmar’s embattled military government cracks down on free flow of news by blocking VPNs,” AP, June 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-censorship-virtual-private-network-facebook-79fb4cc0c3c4317844d0c00b0be1d9d1;  “Myanmar junta restricts more mobile apps, residents say,” Radio Free Asia, July 23, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20250329190006/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/google-signal-blocked-myanmar-07232024151304.html.

[6] “The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting the Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes,” InterSecLab, September 9, 2025, https://interseclab.org/research/the-internet-coup/.

[7] “Myanmar’s cyber law a serious threat to privacy, speech, and security,” Human Rights Myanmar, January 13, 2025,  https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/myanmars-cyber-law-a-serious-threat-to-privacy-speech-and-security/; Republic of Myanmar, State Administration Council, Cybersecurity Law (State Administration Council Law No. 1/2025) [unofficial translation], January 1, 2025,  https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/2025-version-Lincoln.pdf.  

[8] “Myanmar: Arbitrary arrests, torture of political prisoners and digital repression used to crush the anti-junta movement,” Civicus Monitor, October 2024, https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/myanmar-arbitrary-arrests-torture-of-political-prisoners-and-digital-repression-used-to-crush-the-anti-junta-movement/.

[9] “Analysing 4 years of journalist detentions in post-coup Myanmar,” Human Rights Myanmar, June 16, 2025, https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/analysing-4-years-of-journalist-detentions-in-post-coup-myanmar/; “Myanmar journalist Than Htike Myint sentenced to 5 years in prison for terrorism,” Committee to Protect Journalists, May 2, 2025, https://cpj.org/2025/05/myanmar-journalist-than-htike-myint-sentenced-to-5-years-in-prison-for-terrorism/.

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