Summary
The Myanmar military has exploited the inconsistent application of international human rights standards, including in regard to Israel/Gaza, to justify its own repressive measures. By drawing parallels between international conflicts and domestic issues, the military aims to legitimise its restrictions on freedom of expression and undermine the credibility of international human rights mechanisms.
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Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military has re-established an oppressive regime marked by extensive censorship designed to suppress dissent and control information. This submission briefly contends that the military has exploited the Israel/Gaza conflict, and the failure of international stakeholders to uphold consistent principles, to legitimise its repression of freedom of expression and to undermine international human rights law.1
The report was submitted to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression in response to their call for information.
The strategic use of the Israel/Gaza conflict
Military-controlled state-operated broadcast, print, and digital media outlets control all terrestrial television and radio channels and regularly cover the Israel/Gaza conflict without evident crackdowns specifically related to this topic.2 This lack of direct censorship on the subject may stem from the military’s strategic use of the conflict to divert public attention away from their own human rights abuses, atrocity crimes, and governance failures. By highlighting international conflicts and the associated allegations of atrocities, the military may be seeking to reduce domestic scrutiny and criticism of its actions.
More critically, the military’s willingness to permit comparatively open discourse on the Israel/Gaza conflict may be a tactic to exploit the situation to strengthen a narrative that rationalises authoritarianism and normalises restrictions to human rights including freedom of expression. By drawing parallels between the perceived threats in Israel/Gaza and potential threats within Myanmar, the military aims to legitimise its actions. For instance, state media often draws comparisons between the military’s actions and the Israeli government’s, framing military oppression as necessary and proportionate responses to threats similar to those faced by Israel. The media also draws comparisons between the military’s sense of victimhood from the international community and the experiences of oppression among the people of Gaza.
Perpetuating tropes and drawing parallels
The Myanmar military perpetuates several tropes that seek to justify restrictions to freedom of expression, or attacks upon those who exercise it,3 as legitimate, necessary, proportionate, and indeed desirable. For instance, the military commonly labels dissenting voices as “terrorists” engaging in “subversive” activities in league with foreign powers wishing to interfere in “internal affairs”, justifying military action and long prison sentences. The military also depicts protesters as violent, disorderly, chaotic, and destabilising of society, justifying measures like internet shutdowns, curfews, and violent dispersals. Other tropes relate to protecting religion, preventing extremism, combatting “fake news”, and ensuring “stability”.
The Myanmar public is well-acquainted with these tropes, as they are persistently propagated by the military and its proxies to justify restrictions on freedom of expression and promote a narrative that supports a more restricted civic space. This pattern is evident in state media, which often draws parallels between the Israel/Gaza conflict and domestic threats to “national security” within Myanmar. For instance, state media equates the National Unity Government and other opposition groups in Myanmar with Hamas, using tropes about the necessity of countering “extreme” ideas proposed by “terrorists” funded by foreign powers aiming to undermine “unity” in both Myanmar and Israel/Gaza.4
The influence of external and global narratives
The Myanmar military’s perpetuation of these tropes to justify restrictions to freedom of expression is emboldened by other states normalising similar justifications in relation to the Israel/Gaza conflict. For instance, the Israeli government has argued that restoring internet access to Gaza would facilitate “terrorism”,5 justified the closing of an international media outlet bureau as a threat to “national security”,6 and labeled journalists as “accomplices” to crimes against humanity.7 The Hamas government has also used similar tropes to justify its human rights violations against the Gazan people.8
The military is not the only authoritarian state perpetuating these tropes inside Myanmar. Much of the content relating to Israel/Gaza in Myanmar’s military-controlled state-operated media is selected and translated from Xinhua, the official state-run media agency of the Chinese government.9 Xinhua’s editorial agenda aligns with the Chinese government’s authoritarian stance and has a long history of undermining and politicising international law.10 For instance, in one story broadcast in Myanmar, the United States is alleged to be “responsible” for war crimes in the Israel/Gaza conflict.11
Perpetuation by human rights proponents
The Myanmar military is particularly emboldened when states that advocate for human rights perpetuate the same tropes. For instance, the military has used the heavy-handed crackdown on protests relating to Israel/Gaza globally as a justification for their own crackdowns on dissent in Myanmar, framing their actions as comparable to those of other “democracies”.12
The United States government is an important proponent of freedom of expression internationally but still perpetuates similar tropes regarding Israel/Gaza. For instance, the US has joined a long list of authoritarian governments that when faced with strong criticism have called upon the Qatari government to interfere in the editorial decisions of the international media outlet, Al Jazeera, to prevent “incitement” to “terrorism”.13 The US has also conspicuously reduced its usual defence of freedom of expression.14 For instance, it has ignored, questioned, minimised, or defended attacks against journalists in Israel/Gaza.15 Multiple independent media freedom and human rights organisations have urged the United States government to stop evading allegations that the Israeli government is intentionally targeting violence against journalists and to do more to pursue accountability.16
The United Kingdom government, another proponent of freedom of expression internationally, has also perpetuated the same tropes. For instance, in order to deal with regular protests about Israel/Gaza, the UK announced that it would amend legislation to prevent “extremist” “mobs” that threaten public order and promote “incitement”.17 The UK also pressured police to abuse their powers, increase the use of force against non-violent protesters, and detain individuals for acts that would not be prosecutable under the law.18 Similar backsliding has been reported in other states that generally promote human rights.
Double standards in application
The Myanmar military has been able to point to the US and UK and their use of tropes in relation to Israel/Gaz, and claim double standards. For instance, the state media regularly claims double standards in democratic states recognising and condemning acts of terrorism in Israel/Gaza, while “terrorism” by Myanmar opposition groups is ignored.19 Human rights violations relating to Israel/Gaza may draw qualified criticism, but do not result in any significant measures. Double standards demonstrate selective application of international human rights law based on political alliances rather than universal principles.20
The military’s claims of double standards have broader implications for global human rights discourse. At the very least, it threatens to confuse and undermine understanding of, and support for, the universality of established international human rights laws and standards, both at the domestic level in Myanmar and on the international stage. It discredits international human rights law and undermines efforts to hold authoritarian states accountable. At its worst, constant claims of double standards may promote the normalisation of unlawful, unnecessary, and disproportionate restrictions on human rights, including freedom of expression, and in the long term, threaten to reverse hard-won international norms.
The claim of double standards also enables the military to attack the legitimacy of the United Nations and, by extension, the international rules-based system as a whole. Myanmar’s state-operated media has labelled the United Nations and states that promote human rights as “hypocrites,” “condescending,” “dictators to third world countries,” and “third world bullies.”21 Repeated claims have had an effect on the Myanmar public, many of whom have become deeply sceptical of international mechanisms.22
Conclusion
The strategic use of the Israel/Gaza conflict by the Myanmar military serves to divert attention from their domestic human rights abuses and to rationalise their authoritarian governance. By drawing parallels and perpetuating familiar tropes, the military seeks to normalise repressive measures restricting freedom of expression and discredit international human rights mechanisms, including the United Nations itself. The perceived double standards in the application of human rights law further embolden the military and its allies, and undermine global human rights discourse. To counter these narratives, it is essential for the international community to apply human rights standards consistently and hold all violators accountable, regardless of political alliances. Only through a unified and principled approach can the universality of human rights be upheld and the spread of authoritarianism be curtailed.
Recommendations
- Strengthen international accountability mechanisms: Enhance international mechanisms to ensure that human rights violations are consistently addressed regardless of political alliances. This includes empowering bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by all states, including powerful ones, to mitigate perceptions of double standards.
- Promote independent media and digital rights: Support and protect independent media organisations and digital rights activists in Myanmar and globally. This can be done through funding, training, and providing secure communication tools to help them operate safely despite oppressive regimes. Additionally, international bodies should advocate against internet shutdowns and censorship as violations of fundamental rights.
- Consistent application of human rights standards: International actors, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, must apply human rights standards consistently and avoid political biases. This means condemning and taking action against human rights violations impartially, whether they occur in Israel/Gaza, Myanmar, or any other context.
- Enhance public awareness and advocacy: Increase efforts to educate the global public about the universality of human rights and the dangers of double standards. Public campaigns and educational programs should highlight the importance of consistent human rights application and the risks of normalising repression and censorship.
Footnotes
[1] ICNL (2023), “Assessment of Myanmar Civic Space”: https://www.icnl.org/post/assessment-and-monitoring/country-assessments/assessment-of-myanmar-civic-space; ICNL (2024), “Accessing detentions of journalists in Myanmar 2021-24,” https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Myanmar-journalists-report.pdf
[2] Myanmar’s largest military-controlled state-operated daily newspaper, Kyemon, has covered Israel/Gaza since October 2023: https://www.moi.gov.mm. Myanmar’s independent media mostly operates from exile and has faced the military’s increasing challenges and barriers to reaching the Myanmar public: ICNL (2024), “Accessing detentions of journalists in Myanmar 2021-24,” https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Myanmar-journalists-report.pdf. The independent media covers the Israel/Gaza conflict from a variety of perspectives, as would be expected in any free, open, and vibrant media sector.
[3] These tropes are often used to at least partially justify attacks on journalists and others, including as part of so-called “collateral damage” during armed conflict. For more information, see: ICRC (2004), “The protection of journalists and news media personnel in armed conflict”: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_853_gallois.pdf
[4] Editorial in Myanmar’s largest state-operated daily newspaper: Kyemon (2024), “အမျိုးသားနိုင်ငံရေးတာဝန်”: https://www.moi.gov.mm/npe/amiusaaniungngnrettaawn
[5] This was reportedly put forward by an Israeli delegation at a June 2024 meeting of the International Telecommunications Union in discussions relating to the restoration of internet access in Gaza: The Intercept (2024), “Israel opposes rebuilding Gaza’s internet access because terrorists could go online”: https://theintercept.com/2024/06/21/israel-gaza-internet-rebuild/; BBC monitoring has found what it euphemistically describes as: “some correspondents reporting on troops on the ground in scenes that blur the boundaries between coverage and camaraderie”: BBC (2024), “Analysis: Israeli media’s selective coverage of Gaza war”: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0001cnc
[6] The Jewish Independent (2023), “A draining duty: explaining the Israeli side to Arab media”: https://thejewishindependent.com.au/a-draining-duty-explaining-the-israeli-side-to-arab-media
[7] Prime Minister of Israel (2023), “These journalists were accomplices in crimes against humanity; their actions were contrary to professional ethics”: https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1722548245430141186. Days after the allegations, the Israeli Defence Forces dropped four bombs on the house of one of the accused journalists, killing eight of their family members: Reuters (2023), “Gaza strikes kill family members of journalist targeted by death threats”: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-strikes-kill-family-members-journalist-targeted-by-death-threats-2023-11-20/
[8] For more information on human rights violations, see: Amnesty International (2023), “Amnesty international report 2023/24”: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east/palestine-state-of/report-palestine-state-of/
[9] Xinhua dominates wherever attribution is visible. See for example, an October 2023 article in the largest national daily state-operated newspaper, Kyemon, on the potential impact of the Israel/Gaza conflict: https://www.moi.gov.mm/article/46288; February 2024 article on the actions of the Israeli Defence Forces: https://www.moi.gov.mm/npe/accrettpmaachuttkhaasaapiineaak-gjaari-gaabhaaliiyaackhnn-luupeng-70-thkmnnnysechun; and May 2024 article on Hezbollah attacks against Israel: https://www.moi.gov.mm/npe/accreniungngnmeaakpiungsiu-hcjbhiulaamaak-dunknnyphngpckhttttiukkhiuk. Xinhua is dominated by Chinese government propaganda: U.S. Department of Justice (2020), “Obligation of Xinhua News Agency North America to Register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act”: https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/letters-determination/xinhua/dl
[10] See for example, the European Parliament’s analysis of Xinhua coverage of EU institutions which summarises Xinhua’s general hostility towards the EU’s activities to defend human rights. See also: Kurlantzick (2023), “Beijing’s Global Media Offensive”: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/beijings-global-media-offensive-9780197515761
[11] Xinhua does not provide evidence, clarification, or grant a right of reply. The quote attributes direct responsibility to the United States for the bombing rather than, for example, indirect responsibility by supplying arms used in a war crime: Kyemon (2023), “ဆိုးရွားတဲ့ အကျိုးဆက်တွေ ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာစေနိုင်တဲ့ အစ္စရေး – ပါလက်စတိုင်း ပဋိပက္ခ”: https://www.moi.gov.mm/article/46288
[12] Editorial in Myanmar’s largest state-operated daily newspaper: Kyemon (2024), “အမျိုးသားနိုင်ငံရေးတာဝန်”: https://www.moi.gov.mm/npe/amiusaaniungngnrettaawn
[13] The US government urged the Qatari government to interfere in the editorial decisions of an international media outlet to “tone down” coverage on the Israel/Gaza conflict and stop “incitement”: Axios (2023), “Scoop: Blinken says he asked Qatari PM to rein in Al Jazeera war coverage, per sources”: https://www.axios.com/2023/10/25/tony-blinken-qatar-israel-hamas. Other governments have included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, each repeating the trope that the outlet’s critical coverage of their governments was inciting “terrorism”: The Guardian (2023), “US asks Qatar to ‘turn down the volume’ of Al Jazeera news coverage”: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/oct/27/us-asks-qatar-to-turn-down-the-volume-of-al-jazeera-news-coverage. The extent to which Al Jazeera is independent from the Qatari government, which partially funds the outlet, has long been debated, but the outlet claims to be the largest independent media in the Arab world, is disliked by many authoritarian governments, is renowned for promoting global south perspectives, and has a very large global audience: Voice of America (2024), “What led up to Israel shuttering Al Jazeera”: https://www.voanews.com/a/what-led-up-to-israel-shuttering-al-jazeera/7598870.html
[14] Human Rights Watch (2024), “How to End America’s Hypocrisy on Gaza”: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/08/how-end-americas-hypocrisy-gaza; BBC (2024), “US says Israeli army units violated human rights”: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68925495; Reuters (2024), “Blinken denies US double standard over alleged Israeli rights abuses”: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gaza-war-has-negatively-impacted-human-rights-says-us-report-2024-04-22/; The Guardian (2024), “‘Different rules’: special policies keep US supplying weapons to Israel despite alleged abuses”: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/us-supply-weapons-israel-alleged-abuses-human-rights; ProPublica (2024), “Blinken Says Israeli Units Accused of Serious Violations Have Done Enough to Avoid Sanctions. Experts and Insiders Disagree”: https://www.propublica.org/article/blinken-israel-military-aid-human-rights-violations-leahy-law; Al Jazeera (2024), “US overlooks Israeli abuses in Gaza to justify arms transfers: Advocates”: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/27/us-overlooks-israeli-abuses-in-gaza-to-justify-arms-transfers-advocates. The allegations of double standards go back before the most recent Israel/Gaza conflict: Human Rights Watch (2019), “US Human Rights Report Whitewashes Israel’s Abuses Against Palestinians”: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/24/us-human-rights-report-whitewashes-israels-abuses-against-palestinians
[15] Committee to Protect Journalists (2024), “Journalist casualties in the Israel-Gaza war”: https://cpj.org/2024/06/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict/. The United States government has been criticised for not clearly condemning the government of Israel’s closure of a media bureau of Al Jazeera: U.S. Department of State (2024), “Department Press Briefing”: https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-6-2024/. When challenged over the unprecedented scale of violence against journalists, the government has chosen to defend the Israeli government rather than call for investigations: Al Jazeera (2023), “US says ‘no evidence’ Israel forces targeted Al Jazeera”: https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2023/10/27/us-says-no-evidence-israel-forces-targeted-al-jazeera. It has also questioned the veracity of Palestinian media outlets: Reuters (2023), “Biden says he has ‘no confidence’ in Palestinian death count”: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-he-has-no-confidence-palestinian-death-count-2023-10-26/. It has downplaying civilian killings as the price of war: The White House (2023), “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia in Joint Press Conference”: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/25/remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-anthony-albanese-of-australia-in-joint-press-conference/
[16] Knight First Amendment Institute (2024), “Letter to President Biden from Press Freedom and Human Rights Organizations”: https://knightcolumbia.org/documents/f5d85kzjxf
[17] BBC (2023), “More powers for policing protests considered by government”: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-67400936
[18] The Independent (2023), “Government wants extremism crackdown as Met Police chief says force will be ‘ruthless’ at protests”: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/palestine-protests-police-braverman-extremism-b2437899.html. The letter can be found at: Home Secretary (2023), “Letter to Chief Constables in England and Wales following the Israel-Hamas conflict”: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-chiefs-asked-to-protect-communities-from-provocations/letter-to-chief-constables-in-england-and-wales-following-the-israel-hamas-conflict-accessible
[19] Kyemon (2024), “အကြမ်းဖက်မှုအန္တရာယ် တားဆီးကာကွယ်”: https://www.moi.gov.mm/article/55114
[20] Global New Light of Myanmar (2021), “published lengthy stories about double standards in recognizing and condemning acts of ‘terrorism’”: https://www.gnlm.com.mm/let-us-practise-what-we-preach-and-be-consistent/; Global New Light of Myanmar (2021), “Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”: https://www.gnlm.com.mm/response-to-the-remarks-by-ms-christine-schraner-burgener-special-envoy-of-the-un-secretary-general-for-myanmar-made-at-the-un-security-council-session-on-31-march-2021/; Tonkin (2007), “The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of Communication?”: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798813; International Commission of Jurists (1991), “The Burmese Way: To Where?”: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Myanmar-Burmese-way-fact-finding-report-1991-eng.pdf. See also years of international statements made by the Myanmar delegation at the United Nations Human Rights Council in response to annual reports from the Special Rapporteur responsible for reporting on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
[21] Kyemon (2024), “အသုံးမဝင် အကျိုးမရှိ”: https://www.moi.gov.mm/npe/asunmwng-akiumri
[22] In the immediate aftermath of the February 2021 coup, the public had high expectations that the United Nations and the international community would act to protect the Myanmar public: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2021), “Myanmar pleads for the world to honour the responsibility to protect”: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/myanmar-pleads-for-the-world-to-honour-the-responsibility-to-protect/. Since then, the public has lost all hope in the United Nations: The Irrawaddy (2024), “Myanmar and the International Protection Racket”: https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/myanmar-and-the-international-protection-racket.html . To the extent that it, and by extension the international rules-based system, has often become the subject of ridicule: See for example, memes related to the United Nations on the Facebook page “Burmese Protest Memes and Signs Translated and Explained”: https://www.facebook.com/Burmese.Protest.Memes/. The public, including human rights defenders and political activists, increasingly regard the use of force as the only means to end the military coup: BBC (2022), “Myanmar: Why once peaceful protesters are now choosing violence”: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60137053