The impact of digital platforms on Myanmar’s media during the 2025–6 elections

Executive Summary

After the 2021 coup, independent media were forced into exile, leaving many outlets wholly dependent on social media platforms to reach audiences, publish reporting, and sustain their work. This report, one of a series on media freedom during the 2025-26 sham elections, reveals how heightened reliance has exposed the media to a growing range of human rights harms originating from both digital platforms themselves and from their users.

Key Findings

• International standards and platform commitments to protect media content, especially during elections, are wide-ranging but lack mechanisms for ensuring implementation. Commitments without adequate transparency or remedies are effectively meaningless.
• Myanmar’s elections acted as a catalyst for digital hostility, with 69% of media reporting that threats worsened during the election countdown. This surge in hostile content, often unmoderated by platforms, effectively alienated the media from its audience at a critical civic moment.
• Every media was affected by arbitrary deletions made by unaccountable and opaque “black box” algorithms. Platforms deleted journalistic photography, videos, and critical text reporting, often removing public interest information and vital evidence of human rights abuses.
• Platforms proved unreachable during the electoral period. While 88% of media attempted to appeal unfair deletions, 82% found the process entirely useless, describing the experience as “shouting into a void” due to a lack of accessible human review.
• Platforms have become inadvertent tools of financial censorship. 50% of media receive zero monetisation revenue because platform eligibility requirements, such as host country business registration, are unattainable for media operating in exile.

While platforms have publicly committed to international human rights standards, their failure in practice to protect exile media has created an accountability gap. Addressing these failures is no longer just a technical adjustment but an essential intervention to prevent the permanent erasure of independent voices from the global digital ecosystem.

Introduction

After five years of systemic human rights atrocities, the military attempted to finalise its coup objectives by holding elections between December 2025 and January 2026. These polls were widely condemned as a “sham” by the international community and failed to gain recognition from regional bodies.^[1]

While our previous report, How the Military Blocked Independent Media During the 2025-5 Elections, examined the military’s capture of digital infrastructure, this report shifts the focus to the digital platforms. The objective was to document the lived experience of independent media as they navigated global social media ecosystems during the countdown to the polls.

The lived experience included not only attacks online from the military and its allies, but also the effect of platforms’ policy enforcement. This report looks at the platforms’ content moderation systems and the effect on media editorial choices, monetisation, and ultimately their viability. The findings are grounded in the standards in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and international programmes like the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity. 

1.1. Methodology

The findings in this report are derived from a rapid-response mechanism that provided technical and advocacy support to media facing digital violations during the 2025 and 2026 election cycle. The report focuses on the digital platforms most commonly used by the Myanmar media, but many of the findings can be applied to all other and future platforms.

We worked with 44 media outlets during this project and also conducted qualitative surveys with their senior personnel, editors, and media owners who were navigating systemic digital interference. The percentage figures throughout the report are based on those 44 outlets but are also illustrative of the broader media sector in Myanmar. 

We have preserved the raw sentiment of the media’s testimonies. This ensures that the report reflects not just quantitative data, but the professional perceptions of media regarding platform failures during this national political process. To protect the safety of all participants, no identifying information has been provided.

2. International standards and platform commitments

The media’s experiences of digital platforms during elections and in conflict zones must be measured against established international human rights frameworks and the commitments of those platforms to protect media freedom. This section outlines some of the applicable international standards and the platforms’ relevant policies.

2.1. UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)

The UNGPs serve as the authoritative global standard for addressing human rights impacts linked to business activity. Several principles are directly relevant to the media’s experiences on digital platforms:

• Principle 13 (Responsibility to Respect): This foundational principle mandates that companies must avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts. This includes impacts caused by platforms through their moderation activities.
• Principle 17 (Human Rights Due Diligence): Companies are required to identify, prevent, and mitigate risks. In the context of the Myanmar elections, international standards dictate “heightened” due diligence. This requires platforms to be more proactive in protecting vulnerable voices in a conflict environment.
• Principle 31 (Effectiveness Criteria): This principle sets the benchmark for grievance mechanisms. It requires that platform content moderation appeals mechanisms be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, and transparent.

2.2. UNESCO Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms

The UNESCO Guidelines provide a framework for platforms to safeguard human rights while addressing online harms. The context-specific provisions, in particular, are essential for media operating in high-risk environments like Myanmar:

• Electoral Integrity (Paras 131–141): Platforms are expected to conduct transparent and gender-responsive risk assessments ahead of elections. They must ensure algorithms do not block diverse viewpoints and must maintain public archives of political advertisements and their funding.
• Emergencies and Armed Conflict (Paras 142–144): In conflict zones, platforms must conduct “heightened” human rights due diligence. Key mandates include providing human content review with local linguistic expertise and establishing early warning systems for physical harm. They must also preserve evidence of potential war crimes for international accountability mechanisms.
• Protection of Groups at Risk (Para 130): Platforms must implement specific safeguards for journalists and human rights defenders. This includes conducting systemic gender impact assessments and establishing procedures to prevent the misuse of bad-faith reporting tools used to censor professional voices.

2.3. Meta, including Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp

Digital platforms have established their own internal policies to apply the international standards and their own corporate values and practices. Meta has established a complex layer of policies intended to protect the information ecosystem on the platforms Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, many of which contain specific protections for the media.

• Corporate Human Rights Policy: Meta explicitly commits to the UNGPs and pledges to protect “human rights defenders and journalists” from overbroad surveillance and State-driven interference.
• Approach to Elections: This policy outlines a framework for protecting elections online. It commits Meta to preventing interference, fighting misinformation, increasing transparency, and empowering people to vote.
• Community standards: This policy sets out what content the company will delete from its platforms. It includes the rules on misinformation, violent and graphic content, among others.
• Newsworthiness Allowance: A critical provision stating that content violating standard community rules may remain on the platform if its “public interest value”, such as documenting human rights abuses or electoral irregularities, outweighs the risk of harm.

2.4. Google and YouTube

Google’s commitments are rooted in its Human Rights First approach that applies across its Search and YouTube ecosystems.

• Human Rights at Google: This foundational policy pledges to uphold the UNGPs and the Global Network Initiative (GNI) Principles, mandating that human rights due diligence be integrated into product deployment.
• YouTube EDSA Exceptions: YouTube provides formal exceptions for Educational, Documentary, Scientific, or Artistic (EDSA) content, which would include media content. This includes that graphic footage from conflict zones is permitted if accompanied by sufficient journalistic context (e.g., date, location, and condemnation of violence).
• YouTube Elections Misinformation Policy: This policy prohibits voter suppression while promising to “raise up authoritative information” from verified news sources in search results.

2.5. TikTok

TikTok has formalised its human rights and election integrity frameworks, particularly regarding public interest accounts.

• Upholding Human Rights Policy: This policy aligns TikTok with the UNGPs and commits the platform to conducting Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRIAs) to identify harms caused by its moderation practices.
• Public Interest Account Policy (Violations and Bans): TikTok establishes a specific enforcement threshold for news entities. It promises a “higher bar” for the permanent removal of such accounts, acknowledging their importance in civic discourse and pledging a tiered system of strikes rather than immediate bans for non-severe violations.
• Protecting Election Integrity: Through this policy, TikTok commits to specialised election task forces and partnerships with local fact-checkers to remove content intended to mislead the community about civic processes.
• Nuanced Account Enforcement: Explicitly mentioned in TikTok’s Newsroom, this standard aims to ensure the public interest is protected during elections by handling enforcement for news organisations “a little differently” to support human rights.

2.6. Telegram

In contrast to the aforementioned platforms, Telegram operates with a significantly leaner policy framework, creating a notable gap in protection.

• Terms of Service and Privacy Policy: Telegram’s moderation is limited to “illegal public content” in public channels, with a zero-sharing policy with governments. It prohibits promoting violence but lacks any specific framework for protecting journalists or documenting human rights.
• Ads Policy (Section 5.5): Explicitly prohibits ads related to political campaigns, elections, or candidates, stating that ads related to “sensitive topics” can be suspended.

The discrepancy between the high-level policy commitments made by all the digital platforms and their practical application forms the core of the media’s struggle. While platforms promise protection and due diligence on paper, the reality on the ground during the election period was one of profound insecurity.

3. A climate of fear and the reality of digital threats

The 2025-6 election cycle intensified a climate of fear where digital threats facilitated real-world violence. 86% of the media reported specific instances of intimidation and attacks online. 

86% of the media reported attacks online during the election period

For Myanmar’s media, the online and offline worlds are inextricably intertwined. Digital surveillance and online harassment are inseparable from the encouragement or facilitation of offline harms. A threat made in an online comment section could be a precursor to offline violence. Even if the threat did not materialise offline, psychological and operational harm was done.

3.1. The risks of operating simultaneously in exile and inside

The media faces a violation of the right to seek and impart information on several fronts. While Myanmar’s independent media outlets are often described as exile media, the term is a misnomer. While headquartered abroad, these outlets remain operationally reliant on staff, journalists, and sources inside Myanmar who face constant risk.

Online attacks trigger intense anxiety for the media and for individuals’ families who have been frequently targeted with violence, legal harassment, and extortion by the military. Digital platforms are, therefore, vital lifelines that can also be weaponised. The military can intercept communications through technical means or by arresting and torturing a journalist to reveal their digital networks. A single digital security slip in a host country can lead directly to a raid in Yangon.

3.2. Insecurity in exile

Exile usually provides only partial safety because journalists often lack formal legal status in their host nations. The lack of legal protection creates a climate of constant fear and hyper vigilance. As one media owner stated: “I’m afraid of the police, I’m afraid of the government, I’m afraid of being deported.” “The local authorities are always watching, and I am afraid to go out,” said an editor. 

Fear does not only come from the authorities but also from the wider community. An editor stated: “I am afraid to go out even as a Myanmar person [due to discriminatory attitudes], let alone as a Myanmar journalist.” Another said: “I feel like I’m even being watched by other journalists [from the host nation] at press conferences.” This atmosphere of insecurity is a constant drain on professional resources and mental health.

The threat from the host authorities severely limits movement and the ability to gather news in host countries. One editor noted: “I don’t carry my phone or laptop when I travel because I’m likely to be detained and extorted if the authorities suspect that I’m a journalist.” Even those who have legal papers feel insecure all the time. One journalist explained: “Even though I have some papers, I still feel insecure all the time.”

3.3. Forced to self-censor in exile

Those threats may appear primarily offline, but they are deeply intertwined with the media’s online behaviour too. Host country pressures directly impede the media’s public interest mission. 64% of media admitted to withholding news due to threats in their host country.

“If we report the truth about local police or host government wrongs, we risk being deported back to the military”

One journalist explained: “We are guests here, and if we report the truth about local police or host government wrongs, we risk being deported back to the military.” This prevents them from reporting on the suffering of their own communities. One participant said, “We want to report on the suffering of Myanmar migrants, including our own, but we cannot.” The media have occasionally been forced to retract stories, too. One senior journalist stated: “We had to retract a story due to pressure from the local authorities in our host country.”

3.4. Pervasive attacks online

Attacks against the media are common online. 91% of media reported digital attacks during the election countdown. 47% described these attacks as “very frequent”.

• Violent Threats: 18% of media outlets received death threats, and 28% received threats of physical injury. One editor was told, “I will kill you if you come back. We know where you live, and I’m going to do something.”
• Legal and Professional Harassment: 13% of media outlets reported repeated threats of arrest. An editor said, “We always get threatened with a visit from the police.” 31% faced frequent demeaning language. The rhetoric is carefully calibrated to polarise: “We get asked ‘how many US dollars are you paid for publishing this?’” one editor noted. Another said: “We are consistently called liars and accused of spreading disinformation.” 10% reported being labelled as “traitors” (10%). A journalist stated: “The military call us ‘subversive media’ and the revolutionary forces call us ‘Dalan’ (informant) media.”
• Personal and Gendered Attacks: 55% of attacks on media outlets are deeply personal in nature. 13% experienced doxing, and 8% faced discriminatory language regarding ethnicity or religion. One editor noted: “We have families back inside Myanmar, so we can’t show our faces because we know we’ll put them at risk of attacks from the military.”

3.5. Attacks increased during elections

The polls acted as a catalyst for attacks online. 69% of the media stated that threats worsened during the elections. One editor noted: “Attacks against us became more severe during the election period as we faced more threats to ourselves and our families.” Another editor added: “Violent rhetoric and harsh responses to the media increased during the elections,” while one noted that “it seemed like there were more military supporters on digital platforms during the elections.”

69% of the media stated that threats worsened during the elections

Attackers would “platform shop” to exploit platforms with the weakest rule enforcement. 68% of media believed that comments and engagement became far more aggressive. As one editor observed: “The style of attack changed during the elections,” becoming far more violent. This led to noticeably increased audience anxiety and effectively alienated the media from its supporters at the very moment they were needed most.

4. The human cost of algorithmic moderation

Digital platforms can further restrict media freedom through flawed content moderation systems. During the election cycle, these systems often overruled the media’s professional freedom to determine what is both newsworthy and ethically appropriate.

4.1. Over-moderation

Every media outlet was affected by platform content moderation systems, deleting journalistic content. Photography was the most frequently affected medium, with 76% of media reporting that they had journalistic photos deleted by the platforms. Videos were reported to be deleted by 59% of media outlets. Even written reporting was not immune, with 20% of media reporting deletions of plain text content. One editor believed that most deletions were made by automated systems triggered by keywords and basic image recognition.

76% of media reported that they had journalistic photos deleted by the platforms 

These deletions struck at serious public interest reporting during the election period. A journalist noted that, “videos including the result of military violence were often deleted.” Moderation systems often appeared to flag the aftermath of air strikes or infantry raids as violations of safety policies rather than recognising them as information of exceptional public interest during the elections, as well as evidence of potential war crimes.

An editor highlighted the clinical and context blind nature of these deletions, giving the example that “images of partially clothed refugee children were deleted” during the election countdown. While designed as a safety measure, this policy effectively censored media trying to document the dire conditions in displacement camps. Another editor gave an example that “images of citizenship cards” were deleted, presumably for privacy reasons, which obstructed critical reporting on the bureaucratic erasure of ethnic minorities from voting lists.

These examples and others were symptomatic of moderation errors, what platforms call “false positives.” Media, however, called it “censorship”, expressing deep frustration with platforms’ interference in media freedom. One journalist said, “Really important news has been censored.”

4.2. “Black box” moderation

The media characterised this platform moderation as an opaque “black box”; an automated system whose decision-making processes are hidden from the user. Black box systems prioritise cost-effective algorithmic automation over the nuanced context required for “heightened” due diligence in conflict zones, transforming digital platforms into censors.

The system is known as a black box because its decisions are opaque. 75% of media reported receiving generic notifications about content deletions with “no reason given” but citing unspecified violations. This lack of transparency leaves media in a state of “constant worry,” as editors must guess what might trigger a deletion.

Media were also concerned that when the black box systems cannot distinguish between journalistic documentation of conflict and a combatant promoting violence, or between public interest news and extremist propaganda, the algorithmic default is to delete both. 

Uncertainty about moderation leads to pre-emptive self-censorship in just the same way that people self-censor when faced with vague laws. Media actively or unintentionally risk-assess reporting on news that was deemed algorithmically uncertain. 

4.3. The graphic violence paradox

One of the most commonly cited examples of problematic black box decision-making was in relation to violence. The media wants to report on newsworthy violence, yet it often triggers the automated systems designed to keep violence off the platforms. Platforms failed to distinguish between perpetrators of violence and media documenting it in the public interest.

“By deleting our conflict coverage, the platforms are penalising the witness and helping the murderer hide the evidence” 

Consequently, 68% of the media reported deletions of news relating to violence. As one editor lamented: “By deleting our conflict coverage, the platforms are penalising the witness and helping the murderer hide the evidence.” Another journalist stated: “A military-backed party is contesting the elections, and our role is to show voters the violence that they are perpetrating.”

4.4. Hate speech, impersonation, and intellectual property

While violence was the justification most commonly highlighted by the media for deleting their content, other moderation policies were also enforced:

• Hate speech: 30% of media reported deletions under non-discrimination rules, often for reporting on minority groups like the Rohingya or holding the military accountable for discriminatory speeches.
• Impersonation: 27% reported deletions for news featuring military officials. Platforms flagged this as impersonation despite the intent of public oversight.
• Copyright infringement: 30% reported deletions for infringement, with some stating it was a weaponised tactic, where pro-military actors falsely claimed ownership of images or video to trigger automated restrictions.

4.5. Moderation worsened during the elections

Although international standards require digital platforms to take additional steps to protect election integrity, 79% of the media saw no improvements in over-moderation, or “false positives”, as the platforms call it. One editor observed that, “social media platforms continued to make news unavailable to a large audience.”

21% believed that over-moderation worsened during the elections, with a surge in errors

The remaining 21% believed that over-moderation worsened during the elections, with a surge in errors. One editor noted: “During the election period, platforms took more stringent actions [including] deletions, factcheck labels, and reduced reach.” Labels in particular delegitimised the media at the exact moment it was needed to counter military disinformation and propaganda around the elections. 

When ranking platforms by their level of restrictiveness, a clear consensus emerged. Facebook was identified as the most significant hurdle to free expression, with 65% of media stating that it deleted a greater proportion of content than any other platform. This was followed by YouTube (20%) and TikTok (15%). These rankings suggest that the platforms most vital for audience reach may also be the environments where media face the most aggressive deletions.

4.6. The failure of recourse and appeal

Most digital platforms have mechanisms for recourse for deleted content, including via appeals systems. However, for the vast majority of media, challenging an unfair removal was regarded as an exercise in futility. While 88% of media attempted to appeal deletions, 82% found the process entirely useless. “It is like shouting into a void,” one journalist said. Another noted, “We tried to appeal, but it did not work. Instead, we lost a lot of audience reach, all because of the platform.”

Appeals regarding political content were described by the media as particularly difficult, even when the newsworthiness was undeniable. An editor shared their frustration: “I feel like it is much harder to win when it comes to political content.” While another stated that, “media appeals should work more often given that political content is very newsworthy.”

The lack of human contact in the platform moderation systems and a failure to understand the Myanmar context remained critical concerns for media. Most platforms were believed to have deprioritised specialised teams dealing with media, leaving the outlets with “no human to listen.” 

When asked to rank the most difficult platforms to reach for media-specific support, 48% of media said “Facebook”, followed by YouTube (28%) and TikTok (24%). Even when civil society organisations intervene with the platforms, the process is slow. As one editor stated: “Even if you eventually get the content restored, the news is dead by the time the platform replies.” In a 24-hour news cycle during an election, a takedown is a failure, and a reversal a week later does not constitute a success.

5. Financial exclusion and its impact on media viability

Media viability is fundamental to media independence, sustainability, and freedom. The Myanmar media’s viability is particularly precarious due to its exile. Traditional revenue streams such as sales and advertising are largely impossible when the military controls public spaces, denies access to the broadcast spectrum, and threatens companies with reprisals.

The undermining of media viability increased in the countdown to the elections as several long-standing donors withdrew all international assistance for Myanmar. The U.S.A cut all funding to the media in 2025, Sweden announced a phasing out by June 2026, and Germany has recently decreased its financial commitments.

5.1. The platform monetisation crisis

This leaves independent media significantly and increasingly dependent on digital platform revenue to survive, commonly known as “monetisation”. However, only 35% of the media have successfully monetised content on Facebook, 39% on YouTube, and only 13% on TikTok. Indeed, 50% of the media are receiving no monetisation revenue whatsoever. These low proportions reflect that platforms’ monetisation rules are not flexible enough to deal with the specific realities of media operating in conflict and exile.

“Monetisation denial is just another form of censorship”

The primary barrier is the platforms’ one-size-fits-all approach to eligibility, based on the realities of countries like the U.S.A. Of those media which are not monetising from platforms, 50% reported that platform requirements are unachievable in an exile context. Platforms demand corporate stability and formal business registration, which is impossible for media operating in a precarious legal limbo. An editor said: “We get no income from the platforms because they do not allow us in their monetisation programme.”

Because many media cannot register as businesses in their host countries, they cannot open the specific bank accounts required by platforms. One owner said, “We don’t get paid because we don’t have a bank account that Facebook finds acceptable.” Another said, “We used to make money from YouTube, but nowadays we receive nothing from them”, said one media owner.

This creates a cycle of exclusion where the platforms collect advertising revenue on content produced at high risk by the Myanmar media, yet keep 100% of the profit. One editor stated: “The platforms actively discriminate against us.” Another added that, “monetisation denial is just another form of censorship.”

5.2. Over-moderation leads to demonetisation

Another barrier to monetisation is the sanctions regime used by platforms’ content moderation systems. Most systems incrementally deny monetisation for every act of moderation. One piece of deleted content may not affect monetisation, but two or three deletions can lead to complete demonetisation for long periods of time. 15% of those media not monetising reported being barred from revenue programmes due to such sanctions.  

One editor noted: “We are constantly flagged by the platform’s content moderation system, our content deleted, and our account demonetised, despite being a well-respected media outlet.” This leads to a “Sword of Damocles” effect where media survival depends on not triggering a black box content moderation algorithm.

According to the media, platforms also frequently flag political news as sensitive or non-monetisable. This creates a perverse incentive structure that punishes the public interest mission of journalism. As one journalist noted: “We find it the hardest to monetise political news, which during the election is basically all of it.” This forces media into an impossible choice to fulfil their democratic duty to report on the election, or to sanitise their reporting to satisfy their need for sustainability.

6. Technology-facilitated gender-based violence

Women journalists faced a double burden of professional and gendered attacks. During the election cycle, 88% of women reported experiencing discrimination and intimidation compared to 81% of men. 

Furthermore, 77% of women reported experiencing specific technology-facilitated gender-based violence online. 33% reported that attacks utilised stigmatising language regarding their personal life and family. This includes the use of deepfake imagery to tarnish credibility. One woman shared: “They don’t just attack my reporting; they attack my character and my body.” Another stated: “They post my photos on pro-military channels with disgusting captions to shame my family and me.”

6.1. Discrimination within the newsroom

The challenge faced by women is embedded within some newsroom cultures and goes unnoticed by some men. While 56% of women recognised that attacks against them were distinct in nature, only 36% of their male colleagues shared this view. 

This lack of internal recognition may exacerbate the isolation of women journalists, who may face harassment from colleagues ranging from a lack of professional respect to being treated as sexual objects. One editor stated: “When women journalists work, they are shown less respect from the community.” Another editor noted that “women journalists often face sexual advances from the community.”

For ethnic minority and LGBT+ journalists, digital attacks are often combined with exclusionary rhetoric. For the 2% of the media identifying as LGBT+, identity was regarded as the primary vector for a digital attack, including from colleagues. One editor stated: “As an LGBT journalist, harassment from colleagues is still common.”

7. Conclusion

The findings of this report demonstrate that for Myanmar’s independent media, the 2025–6 election cycle was not just a political event, but a stress test that the global digital ecosystem failed. The digital attacks documented in this report and characterised by systemic interference, algorithmic erasure, and financial strangulation, remain in place long after the polls have closed.

The survival of truth in Myanmar now depends on a fundamental shift in how digital platforms and the international community engage with media in conflict. We are moving past the era where commitments to human rights alone are sufficient. To prevent the decline of the independent media, platforms must move toward localised, human-centred moderation systems and inclusive monetisation protocols that recognise the unique status of media in exile.

Without immediate intervention to dismantle these digital barriers, the military’s goal of a news-free Myanmar will be achieved, not by their own hand alone, but through the inadvertent cooperation of the platforms the world relies on for information. The choice for platforms and donors is now clear: adapt to the reality of the digital attacks or witness the erasure of the voices holding power to account.

7.1. Recommendations

• Digital platforms must implement heightened human rights due diligence specifically for conflict zones, replacing automated, context-blind moderation with localised human review teams that understand Myanmar’s linguistic and political nuances, and the role of the media.
• Platforms should establish a white list or fast-track mechanism for independent media, ensuring that public interest journalism is protected from arbitrary deletions and that reach is not restricted during critical civic events.
• Platforms must reform financial eligibility protocols to allow media operating in exile to monetise their content without requiring unattainable host-country business registrations, ensuring advertising revenue generated by Myanmar audiences supports independent journalism.
• International donors and foreign governments should provide sustained, flexible funding for exiled media that accounts for digital attacks, including technical support for cybersecurity and advocacy to pressure platforms to honour their international human rights commitments.
• Host governments must respect the principles of non-refoulement and end all forms of micro-intimidation or deportation threats against Myanmar journalists, recognising their vital role in regional stability and the global right to information.

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Footnotes

^[1] OHCHR (2026), “Myanmar: UN expert’s report highlights junta’s fraudulent claim to legitimacy, urges States to denounce 2023 ‘sham’ elections”; AP (2026), “ASEAN does not recognize Myanmar’s elections, which military-backed party claims to have won”.

This project was delivered with the support of an international donor organisation that has chosen to remain anonymous for risk management purposes.