Myanmar freedom on the net 2025

Summary

This year’s Freedom on the Net report finds that internet freedom in Myanmar remained one of the worst in the world, alongside China, with a score of 9 points out of 100. The military’s installation of advanced deep packet inspection technology and the resulting VPN block significantly worsened the situation, shifting the country from basic to advanced digital repression. This report, published by Freedom House in partnership with HRM, alongside a hundred other national reports, uses 21 indicators to measure and compare internet freedom.

Jump to:
Key developments
Global map
Obstacles to access (scores)
Limits on content (scores)
Violations of user rights (scores)
Read Freedom House’s global report

Myanmar remained one of the world’s worst environments for internet freedom, with a score of 9 out of 100 points.

The military, which seized control of the state in a 2021 coup, continued to impose localized internet shutdowns, manipulate online information, and imprison people for their online expression of dissent amid an ongoing civil war between the military regime and its armed opponents. The military’s direct and indirect control over all major service providers enabled mass censorship and surveillance, including broad limits on social media platforms and anticensorship tools.

Read the full global report on Freedom House’s website >

Key developments

  • A March 2025 earthquake in Mandalay severely damaged telecommunications infrastructure in the region, disrupting internet services.[1] The disaster exacerbated similar damage throughout the country that resulted from the civil war (A1).[2]
  • The military imposed frequent internet shutdowns at the local level, often in connection with armed attacks,[3]impeding the documentation of rights abuses and the delivery of lifesaving medical aid (A3).[4]
  • In June and July 2024, authorities blocked access to the encrypted messaging application Signal and major virtual private networks (VPNs); VPNs were widely used to circumvent website blocking and enable more private online activity (B1 and B7).[5]
  • Over a dozen telecommunications providers and internet companies had installed surveillance and censorship technology on behalf of the military authorities by 2024 (B3 and C5).[6]
  • In January 2025, the military regime adopted the Cybersecurity Law, which codified overbroad censorship mandates, limited the operations of VPN providers, and imposed local data retention requirements, among other provisions (B3, B6, and C6).[7]
  • Authorities detained, forcibly disappeared, and killed people in retaliation for their online activities.[8] For example, courts sentenced journalists Htet Aung and Than Htike Myint to 10 and five years’ imprisonment in June 2024 and April 2025, respectively, to punish their independent reporting for online outlets. They were among hundreds of journalists whom the authorities had unjustly detained or imprisoned since the 2021 coup (C3 and C7).[9]

Political Overview 

Military commanders seized control of Myanmar’s government in February 2021, ending a period of power sharing between military and civilian leaders under a 2008 constitution that had been drafted by a previous junta. Since the coup, the military has violently suppressed peaceful civic dissent and battled a sizable armed resistance movement that has widespread popular support and includes various armed ethnic minority groups. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which led the civilian government before the coup and won a sweeping victory in the November 2020 elections, serves as the political backbone of a National Unity Government (NUG). Armed ethnic groups and resistance groups with ties to the NUG exercise partial or effective control over a growing swathe of territory. Millions of people remain displaced or have been newly displaced by the ongoing civil war, with many seeking refuge abroad.

Notes

This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. The U.S. administration’s decision in 2025 to cut development aid also affected this project, resulting in a reduced report. For additional background information, see last year’s full report on Freedom House’s website. 

A: Obstacles to Access

A120242025
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections?2/62/6
A220242025
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 0/30/3
A320242025
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity?0/60/6
A420242025
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers?0/60/6
A520242025
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner?0/40/4

B: Limits on Content

B120242025
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?0/60/6
B220242025
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?1/41/4
B320242025
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process?0/40/4
B420242025
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship?1/41/4
B520242025
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest?1/41/4
B620242025
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online?0/30/3
B720242025
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability?1/41/4
B820242025
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues?1/61/6

C: Violations of User Rights

C120242025
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence?0/60/6
C220242025
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards?0/40/4
C320242025
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards?0/60/6
C420242025
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption?1/40/4
C520242025
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy?1/61/6
C620242025
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy?0/60/6
C720242025
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities?0/50/5
C820242025
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack?1/31/3

Footnotes

[1] Amreesh Phokeer, “Myanmar Earthquake: A Crisis Within a Crisis,” Internet Society, April 1, 2025, https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/myanmar-earthquake-a-crisis-within-a-crisis; Oliver Spencer, “Civic Aftershock: How Restricting Civil Society Obstructed Myanmar’s Earthquake Response,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, September 2025, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Myanmar-Civic-Aftershock-ICNL.pdf.

[2] Myanmar Internet Project, “No End in Sight : Situation of Internet Shutdown and Infrastructure Damages in Myanmar,” Progressive Voice Myanmar, July 16, 2024, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2024/07/16/no-end-in-sight-situation-of-internet-shutdown-and-infrastructure-damages-in-myanmar/.

[3]  “Myanmar Communication Blackout, 2021 to Present,” Athan Myanmar, updated August 2025, https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; “Number of times the internet was cut off by Region and State (Feb 2021 to Current),” updated October 2025, Myanmar Internet Project, https://www.myanmarinternet.info/internet-shutdown.

[4] Surachanee Sriyai, “Myanmar’s Internet Shutdowns: Silencing Resistance in the Battle for Connectivity,” Fulcrum, January 24, 2025, https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-internet-shutdowns-silencing-resistance-in-the-battle-for-connectivity/.

[5] Grant Peck, “Myanmar’s embattled military government cracks down on free flow of news by blocking VPNs,” AP, June 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-censorship-virtual-private-network-facebook-79fb4cc0c3c4317844d0c00b0be1d9d1;  “Myanmar junta restricts more mobile apps, residents say,” Radio Free Asia, July 23, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20250329190006/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/google-signal-blocked-myanmar-07232024151304.html.

[6] “The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting the Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes,” InterSecLab, September 9, 2025, https://interseclab.org/research/the-internet-coup/.

[7] “Myanmar’s cyber law a serious threat to privacy, speech, and security,” Human Rights Myanmar, January 13, 2025,  https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/myanmars-cyber-law-a-serious-threat-to-privacy-speech-and-security/; Republic of Myanmar, State Administration Council, Cybersecurity Law (State Administration Council Law No. 1/2025) [unofficial translation], January 1, 2025,  https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/2025-version-Lincoln.pdf.  

[8] “Myanmar: Arbitrary arrests, torture of political prisoners and digital repression used to crush the anti-junta movement,” Civicus Monitor, October 2024, https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/myanmar-arbitrary-arrests-torture-of-political-prisoners-and-digital-repression-used-to-crush-the-anti-junta-movement/.

[9] “Analysing 4 years of journalist detentions in post-coup Myanmar,” Human Rights Myanmar, June 16, 2025, https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/analysing-4-years-of-journalist-detentions-in-post-coup-myanmar/; “Myanmar journalist Than Htike Myint sentenced to 5 years in prison for terrorism,” Committee to Protect Journalists, May 2, 2025, https://cpj.org/2025/05/myanmar-journalist-than-htike-myint-sentenced-to-5-years-in-prison-for-terrorism/.

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